Counter insurgency in afghan essay help

Precisely because the enemy can readily draw reinforcements and material support from the civilian population, is why securing public support is the primary objective. This exposes counter-insurgents and can weaken domestic support, prompting an early withdrawal or compromising the ultimate objectives.

This author will focus on the key issues that governments face in creating effective strategies for irregular warfare with a particular emphasis on counter-insurgency COIN and terrorism.

counterinsurgency in afghanistan

The result is the paradoxical conclusion that minimizing civilian casualties and maintaining domestic support by minimizing counter-insurgent casualties are both militarily necessary for successful COIN. This makes counterinsurgents less able to combat insurgents among the population, and suggests to the receiving populace that the counter-insurgents are unprepared to confront the same dangers the people have no choice but to face.

does counterinsurgency work

The acclaimed U. Problematically, domestic support can be undermined by casualty-aversion in the general public.

why did counterinsurgency fail in afghanistan

It is surprising therefore, that on a matter of such importance, their counterinsurgency endeavours in Afghanistan reveal such low levels of cultural awareness. Whilst ensuring civilian security will require kinetic activity, gains made on that front can only be short-term.

Army and U. ISAF forces meanwhile, too often locate themselves away from population centres, conduct themselves in a culturally offensive fashion and are too risk averse to attempt sincere or permanent local-level engagement.

There is in fact a considerable historical precedent for such a strategy — if only one could learn to more effectually adopt useful lessons from history, and integrate them into military structures and thinking, such problems as outlined in the above chapter would not have ever transpired.

Principles of counter insurgency

In fact, Marston has calculated that only twelve percent of conflicts since could be categorized as conventional, with the remaining eighty-eight percent being irregular. While two cases, Dhofar and Malaya, ended in counterinsurgent victory, and the third, Vietnam, ended in defeat, they all developed tactics and strategies that understood and exploited cultural awareness in order to neutralize and combat the insurgent enemy. When the insurgent poses such a perpetually unpredictable threat, the counterinsurgent will be hesitant to base itself within population centres, or to regularly engage with the population. The three pillars are; advanced military capability, a superior political system, and global economic dominance. As Lyall and Wilson accurately indicate, the U. Army doctrine eventually inaugurated the notoriously conventional Weinberger Doctrine. It is surprising therefore, that on a matter of such importance, their counterinsurgency endeavours in Afghanistan reveal such low levels of cultural awareness. The result is the paradoxical conclusion that minimizing civilian casualties and maintaining domestic support by minimizing counter-insurgent casualties are both militarily necessary for successful COIN. Consequently, indigenous militias and tribal forces can serve as exceptional force multipliers. He does not seek to kill his enemy at a blow, simply to bleed him and feed on him, to plague and bedevil him, to keep him from resting and to destroy his nerve and morale. Broadly stated, modern COIN doctrine stresses the need to protect civilian populations, eliminate insurgent leaders and infrastructure, and help establish a legitimate and accountable host-nation government able to deliver essential human services. This exposes counter-insurgents and can weaken domestic support, prompting an early withdrawal or compromising the ultimate objectives. Precisely because the enemy can readily draw reinforcements and material support from the civilian population, is why securing public support is the primary objective. See also Echevarria , Reisman , and Shaw

Of the various strategies that the United States has employed in Afghanistan over the past dozen years, the troop surge was by far the most ambitious and expensive. This has sabotaged most of its initiatives aimed at garnering popular support and legitimacy.

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Cultural awareness and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan